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To calculate the RE24 of a given plate appearance, simply take the run expectancy of the result of the play, subtract the run expectancy of the the starting state, and add in any runs scored during the play. For example, if the play started with a man on first and no outs there was an original run expectancy of 0.831. If the batter hits a single that results in the runner getting to third and the batter ending on first, the resulting run expectancy would be 1.798. Since no runs were scored on the play, you would simply do the following:

1.798 ]]>

Pitchers Are Slowing Down To Speed Up]]>

I am sure it has been done before, but it has to be a very small list, because there are not many 20+ triples seasons in the same era there have been 30+ homers.

Of course, there is always the chance that Blackmon might go on the 60 Day DL due to lice in his beard.

Edit: I just looked it up. Jim Bottomley is the only member of the 30-20-30 with 120+ R and 130+ RBI club. He did it with the Cardinals in 1928 and won the MVP award, as he led St. Louis to the NL Pennant.]]>

I've been reading about some different advanced metrics, and there are quite a few articles on FanGraphs that tout wOBA as the best overall measure of a hitter. I understand what it is measuring and why it is valuable in theory, but I can't seem to wrap my head around what the actual number represents in the real world.

Here's what I mean: OBP, for example, is literally the percentage of time a hitter reaches base among his plate appearances, so a .400 OBP means he reaches base 40% of the time. The same with BA, ERA, etc. Their value has a practical and literal meaning in the game. SLG, while not a percentage, still means something real, i.e. it represents the number of bases a hitter earns per at bat. Even FIP, while not really the number of runs allowed per nine innnings, still means something like "ERA adjusted for a baseline defense," or something along those lines.

But I don't understand how wOBA maps to anything real like this. I understand that it is scaled to look like OBP, so the value has meaning similar to OBP, but apparently it doesn't actually represent a percentage like OBP does, correct?

So my question is, does it represent anything at all, or is it simply an ethereal number that we need to just have an intuitive sense for when looking at it?

Thanks!]]>

Maybe 5 year running war leadership? OK I see that it might hurt a guy like Ruth or Bonds who push up the LQ of their league all on their lonesome so how about the average of the top 10 war leaders each year?

Looking back more, it doesn't seem to make sense. The lowest war leadership run was the NL from 1930-1947 where the average leader was at 8.5. So WHY is that?]]>

1. Any time a player reaches first base for via single, walk, HBP, or 1-base error, and there are no other runners on base when he gets there, then if he steals second before the next batter completes his plate appearance, it is no different than turning a single into a double. Let's say that Billy Hamilton reaches first base during the year on 193 occasions (what he is on pace for this year with 30 singles and 12 walks, and 2 ROE through 37 games.)

Let's say that in 131 of 193 times he reaches base, he does so by batting with the bases empty (68% of his PAs this year have come with the bases empty.

Then, every time Hamilton steals second, he has turned that BB, HBP, Single, or ROE into the equivalent of a double. For every caught stealing, he has turned that BB, HBP, Single, or ROE into an out. He is on pace for 83 SB and 9 CS. Look at how his stats would differ if we take those SB & CS and change his stats to show extra 2b and Outs. While there are times when Hamilton might steal 2nd with a runner on 3rd, most of his stolen base attempts will be with no other batter ahead of him on the basepaths, so just giving 68% of his successful steals as the equivalent of doubles is a gross underestimate. I am going to tweak that number up to 80% to more correctly approximate how many SBs to turn into doubles, since they would come with nobody ahead of him on base and thus stealing second would be the same as hitting a double.

Hamilton 2017 Pace

G 149 AB 657 H 166 2b 13 3b 18 HR BB 53 HBP 0 ROE 9 SF 3 Slash 253/307/347

Hamilton 2017 Stats counting empty base times at 1st with 83 SB & 9 CS

The 83 SB were turned into doubles by allocating percentage of each type of safe at first event

Singles: 56 SB into Doubles and 6 CS become outs, removing the hit

Walks: 23 SB into Doubles and 2 CS become outs, removing the walk

ROE 4 E into Doubles and 1 CS becomes an out, removing the ROE

80% of this allocation would be

45 SB from singles to doubles & 5 CS from singles to outs

18 SB from walks to doubles & 2 CS from walks to outs

3 SB from error to doubles & 2 CS from E to outs

Thus, Hamilton has the equivalent of this stat line

G 149 AB 682 H 183 2b 79 3b 18 HR 4 BB 33 HBP 0 ROE 4 SF 3 Slash 268/301/455

No current metric is in place that would rate Hamilton's SB and CS by the equivalency of 102 points of OPS, yet there is no difference in what he is on pace to do and the way most of his SB are the equivalent of being doubles. His OBP would be a tad lower with a total of 6 additional outs (9 CS with 3 new Times on Base that are not errors), but his SLG would be astronomically higher, with those 79 Doubles.

2. I don't know if anybody except maybe Baseball Info Solutions has calculated how much different the OPS is for batters batting for the Reds when Hamilton is on 1st base as opposed to when he is not. I do know that Jim Gilliam believed his career was resurrected in the 1960's because he saw many more fastballs with Maury Wills on base. Pitchers and catchers knew that any offspeed pitch made it virtually impossible to catch Wills if he stole, so there were a lot more fastballs. Also, Gilliam believed he saw a lot more pitches on the outside of the plate, and he was able to go the other way with them.

3. With a Hamilton, Wills, Vince Coleman, Tim Raines, Rickey Henderson on 1st, no pitcher can fully concentrate on the batter like he might if an average runner were on 1st. Not only does this cause the pitcher to lose concentration on the batter, all the throws to 1st take a toll on his stamina. Also, all the extra throws are bound to eventually lead to pick-off errors, and these are not factored into the base stealers' records.

4. There is a positive correlation to uber base stealing and runs scored. It is obvious that gaining a base 83 times and making 9 extra outs leads to considerably more runs, and the weighting never really equates that number of runs. When Wills stole 104 bases, he scored 130 runs. He stole just 40 the next year when LA won the World Series, and his run scoring dropped 36%. It went back up to 92 runs in 1965 when the hitless wonder Dodgers won the World Series again, and Wills stole 94 bases.

5. I won't include the Deadball era, but there were teams then that won pennants with more steals than extra base hits. The SB was an essential part of offense, as teams had to bunt and steal bases to score. Being caught stealing or giving up an out on a SH did not take away as much as it would today, because not getting an extra base or sacrificing meant there was little chance to score, as it would take frequently take 3 hits in an inning to score a run in a time when the league OPS was under .650, even under .600 in the AL in 1908. 3 hits in an inning were rare then.]]>

So, am I missing something and if I am, can someone explain what that is to me? Or is BBref doing something unwise?

The link to the page in question is: http://www.baseball-reference.com/ab...position.shtml and you've got to scroll about two thirds of the way down that material (under the heading Replacement Level) to get to what I'm talking about.]]>